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ABSTRACT 
Several definitions and approaches have been proposed to study resilience in different fields like 
materials, ecology, psychology and infrastructures. A general definition, applicable also to human-
made or engineered systems, describes resilience as the ability to maintain capability in case of 
disruption.   
Thanks to its systemic, top-down approach, STAMP (System-Theoretic Accident Model and 
Processes) has been already identified in literature as a very effective and “conductive” reference 
when reasoning about the possible need of resilience of a complex system. The STAMP-based tool 
named STPA (System Theoretic Process Analysis) establishes the following steps: identify system 
accidents, hazards; draw functional control structure; identify unsafe control actions (UCAs); identify 
accident scenarios; formulate decisions and recommendations. It focuses on what actually is in the 
hands of the system designer and operator i.e. the possibility to take action on hazards that can be 
eliminated or controlled. 
In this paper an approach to design resilience into a cruise vessel will be proposed. An application 
case will be developed considering the specific hazard of dead ship condition i.e. of energy black-
out on board. In case of navigation close to the shore and in heavy weather condition, this situation 
can rapidly evolve into a loss. The ship energy production and delivery system, both for the 
propulsion and for the hotel services, will be considered. Running the procedure up to the level of 
UCAs enables the identification of the possible disruptive events capable to degrade the operational 
performance of the system. Starting from this point, suggestions will be discussed for a selected 
UCA, able to prevent or mitigate it. A metric for ship resilience will be proposed as well with the aim 
to allow comparisons among different design solutions. 
 
Keywords: STPA, Resilience; Dead-ship condition. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of power generation and delivery on board is very relevant for any kind of ship. It is 
well known for example that for both passenger and cargo vessels an emergency sources of 
electrical power shall be provided, for essential services under emergency conditions (IMO, 2014). 
Emergency generator and emergency switchboard of the ship should be located above the 
uppermost continuous deck, should have independent fuel supply and be capable of giving power 
for the period of 18 hours for the cargo ship and 36 hours for the passenger ship. 
It  should be capable of supplying simultaneously at least the following services, very basic: 
- Emergency lightening (at the alleyway, stairways, and exits, muster and embarkation 
stations, machinery space, control room, main and emergency switchboard, firemen’s 
outfits storage positions, steering gear room) 
- Fire detecting and alarming system 
- Internal communication equipment 
- Daylight signalling lamp and ship’s whistle 
- Navigation equipment 
- Radio installations, (VHF, MF, MF/HF) 
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- Watertight doors 
- Fire pumps, emergency bilge pump 
 
The  dead-ship condition however is when the ship has just the emergency generator/s working 
in compliance with what above, but there is no power for ship propulsion and manoeuvring, neither 
for the hotel services.  It is a very critical situation especially for cruise ships due to the significant 
number of human lives on board. In recent years characterized by the increment of cruise vessels 
size, the concept that the ship herself represents the best possible lifeboat has earned credit in the 
safety rules framework. Therefore, the need to guarantee a proper amount of energy, in addition to 
the traditional emergency generator support, has become evident. For passenger ships, the safety 
implications of power availability on board are so relevant that from June  2010 the Safe Return to 
Port standard (IMO, 2006) has been introduced. The regulation requires that passenger vessels with 
a length of 120 metres or more or with three or more main vertical zones is to be designed in such 
a way that in the event of a flood or fire emergency, passengers and crew can stay safely on board 
as the ship proceeds to port under her own power. Safe Rerturn to Port criteria defines a threshold 
where the ship’s crew should be able to return to port without requiring passengers to evacuate. The 
power generation that is to be guaranteed onboard is meant not only for propulsion but also for the 
hotel services that can provide a sufficient level of vital comfort to passengers while the ship is on 
the way back to the safe port. 
The overall functional requirements are intended to provide the following capabilities after an 
incident of fire or flooding: 
— Ensure propulsion, steering, manoeuvring and navigational capabilities 
— Ensure necessary service of the safety systems (fire safety and watertight integrity) in the 
remaining part of the ship that is not directly affected by the casualty 
— Support safe areas for passenger and crew for the duration of the return to port voyage (e.g. 
water, sanitation, food, ventilation and light). 
If the casualty extends beyond the defined threshold and the ship must be abandoned, the 
regulations require a limited number of systems to be remain available for 3 hours to facilitate an 
orderly abandonment. 
The outcomes of Safe Return to Port in terms of design features of modern large passenger 
ships is an increased  redundancy on board for propulsion, steering systems and electrical power 
delivery  as well as new adapted architecture of safety or any other relevant systems.  
Nevertheless it is well known that safety is not only a matter of redundancy and systems 
availability. In fact also for ships complying with the Safe Return to Port standards and the relevant 
implied redundancy, black-out is still an issue therefore worth to be investigated  with a different 
perspective.  
The dead-ship situation (i.e. the ship in black-out, the loss of energy for propulsion and 
minimum services vital for human beings) in fact is an emergency situation that can occur 
unexpectedly and  in case of adverse weather condition and proximity to the shore it can rapidly 
evolve in ship loss. 
 
In this paper an approach enabling the integration by design of resilience capability against 
black-out on board  a cruise vessel will be proposed and discussed. The importance of a proper 
framework to model and discuss at an early design level interactions and integration among the 
energy system, the automation system and the human operators become evident during the 
application, evidencing also the importance of designing for operations. 
The current evolution of safety paradigm (from safety-I to safety-II) defines safety as the ability 
to succeed under varying conditions. The understanding of everyday functioning is therefore a 
necessary prerequisite for the understanding of safety performance (Hollnagel et al. 2006; Hollnagel, 
2016). In ‘Safety II’, humans are seen as a resource necessary for flexibility and resilience. But in 
an era where human error is considered the cause of the majority of maritime casualties, the view 
of humans as a safeguard and not a problem is one of the biggest challenge. 
In this respect, a starting point for organizations interested in Safety II is to enhance their 
employees’ resilience, as the ability to monitor things and handle situations (Hollnagel et al. 2015). 
At present and for the specific case of ships, these abilities have to be considered as the result of a 




Focusing on what goes right, rather than on what goes wrong, changes the definition of safety 
from ’avoiding that something goes wrong’ to ’ensuring that everything goes right’ (Hollnagel., 2014). 
The attitude implied in Safety-II is ensuring that things go right but the first step is to acknowledge 
the inevitability and necessity of performance variability, second to find ways to monitor it, and third 
to find ways to control it (Hollnagel, 2016). 
To this aim it seems very helpful the use of STAMP technique and in particular of STPA and 
the Safety Control Structure appears to be effective  to model and reason about the best ways to 
enforce and implement safety from the top to the bottom of the structure, by monitor and control. 
 
2. STPA APPROACH FOR RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT 
Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) is a top-down system-based 
accident model that focuses on enforcing constraints rather than preventing failures (Leveson, 
2011). In this approach, safety is a dynamic control problem rather than a reliability problem. The 
system is described by a hierarchical Safety Control Structure in which each part of the system is 
identified and analysed with its relationship with the other parts of the system, underlining what  they 
communicate and do. The main focus of this approach is to identify the safety constraints that are 
exerted from the Safety Control Structure, because events leading to a loss can occur only when 
safety constraints from a higher level in the Safety Control Structure are not enforced. 
STAMP is used to come up with high-level list of hazards in which disruptive events could 
arise, considering each part of the system as a contributor to the ongoing development of the 
emergent behaviours properties. 
System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is the hazard technique (Leveson, 2011) built 
upon the foundation provided by STAMP, that mainly consists of creating basic system engineering 
information, identifying unsafe control actions and identifying causal factors of unsafe actions. 
The roadmap of STPA consists of: define the purpose of the analysis (identify losses and 
hazards, define system boundaries), model the control structure, identify the unsafe control actions, 
identify loss scenarios. 
In this perspective STPA is applied as a very effective way to understand where and how 
performance variability might happen (Leveson at al. 2006). Therefore it can also suggest how to 
better handle situations. An interesting application of STPA to favour resilience integration  is 
formulated in Beach et al. (2018) where a particular attention to the development of metrics is given 
in order to compare different resilience solutions. 
The STPA approach can be assumed as a possible technique to spot the need of resilience 
when pursuing an emergent property like safety and to subsequently guide its implementation during 
the design process with a link to the operational life of a complex system and the involved human 
operators. The perspective is that safety represents the overall target and resilience is  just an 
enabling mean  or better “the ability of the system to monitor the changing risk profile and take timely 
action to prevent the likelihood of damage” (Madni & Jackson, 2008). As already mentioned, STPA 
focuses on  behavioural safety constraints and it enables the analysis at the socio-organizational 
level. Therefore it can suggest the most appropriate level and “typology” of resilience that should be 
enforced to manage such aspects.  
STPA outputs can be used in many different ways, among which:  
- Drive the system architecture  
- Create executable requirements  
- Identify design recommendations  
- Identify mitigations and safeguards needed  
- Drive new design decisions (if STPA is used during development)  
 
Therefore the four possible resilience modes i.e. avoiding, absorbing, adapting and recovering 
(Madni & Jackson, 2009) can be formulated and implemented in a logic of interactions and interfaces 
to manage (monitor and take timely actions) an hazard.  
The integration of resilience can be performed by design methods grounded in experience. 
One of the most popular is the so called physical redundancy but since we are interested to 
overcome the traditional reliability, the functional redundancy should be considered at least as more 
promising for the purpose of this paper. Many other design methods can be mentioned and a 
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comprehensive list is reported in Madni & Jackson (2009), useful for the last part of the application 
and significant because able to involve also crew members in the process of design for operations. 
 
3. APPLICATION TO A LARGE CRUISE SHIP 
A typical solution for cruise ships is the propulsion performed by electric engines, that are the 
main load for what concerns the electric power generation and delivery system on board. 
Nevertheless for large passenger ships, the sum of all the electric loads necessary for the ship 
operational profile (generally indicated as the “hotel loads”) is comparable to the electric load for 
propulsion. The shipboard power plant consists of electric generator units, for instance synchronous 
generators, that are usually coupled with turbines or diesel engines.   
The power generated by the whole power plant is provided by different units and delivered to 
the main electrical panel (main switchboard) in medium voltage. For the ships with more than 3 MW 
installed on board, the Safety of Life at Sea Convention – SOLAS (IMO, 2014) requires that the main 
panel has to be splitted in at least two sections. The rated voltage usually used for the main panel 
are 3,3kV, 6,6 kV and 11kV. On board cruisers the rated voltage is usually  6,6 kV or 11 kV. 
The power supply of the electrical users is ensured by the distribution grid, that is usually 
subdivided in primary and secondary grid. The first one is in medium voltage, the second one in low 
voltage. Low voltage is usually 690, 440, 230 and 120V. The primary grid supplies the loads that 
need high power, such as the propulsion engines, the thrusters and the air conditioning 
compressors. The low voltage switchboards power the loads that require limited voltage (i.e. 230 V, 
120 V). Moreover, in order to supply high power required by some specific user groups, there are 
some substations to ensure a specific service, for instance the galley (440 V) or the engine room 
(690 V). The shipboard distribution grids can be structured in different ways, depending on the type 
of ship and the power installed on board, such as radial or ring grid. 
An example of a typical power generation and distribution system of a large cruise ship is 





Figure 1: a typical layout of the power generation and distribution system for a cruise ship (Vie, 2014) 
 
In this paper the attention will be focussed on a large cruise ship, during a very preliminary 
design phase when some reasoning about the black-out issue is very appropriate: it is both a safety 
issue (in case the ship propulsion is lost, especially in stormy weather close to the shore) and a 
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commercial issue (in case the hotel service is lost with strong disappointment and discomfort for 
passengers). Usually, the starting point is a scheme like the one shown in figure 1. In an innovative 
perspective, the human factor, its integration with the automation system and the socio-
organizational aspects as well, should be added into the discussion. 
Following the STPA steps as mentioned in the previous paragraph, the hazards, the Safety 
Control Structure and the UCAs have been identified. Since the focus is on the black-out issue 
onboard, the identified hazards are the ones reported in  table 1: 
Table 1 the identified hazards for a focus on black-out on board 
H 1 the ship propulsion is lost 
H 2 the ship hotel services are lost 
 




Figure 2: the Safety Control Structure (GEN-SETs indicate the diesel generators, MSWB is the 
main switchboard and GRID is the general indication for distribution grid) 
 
The diagram has been used then to derive the Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs). Such phase is 
very long and resource consuming, therefore for the purpose of this paper, only a sub domain of 
UCAs has been reported in table 2 (where GEN-SETs indicate the diesel generators, MSWB is the 
main switchboard and GRID is the general indication for distribution grid). 
The considered UCAs are relevant only to the control and feed-back actions between the 
Automation System and the GEN-SETs. Power generators, in fact, they are assumed as one of the 
most important elements when analysing the black-out condition and their functioning is strongly 
dependent on the Automation System. This in turn means that the safety of the ship deriving from 
power delivery is strongly dependent on the proper Automation Systems actions.  
A further selection will be made among the considered UCAs in order to create some examples 
to be finalized with proposal of resilience implementation. To this aim the attention has been focused 
only on one control action i.e. “set the functional mode of the Gen-sets for the requested electric 
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loads” and UCAs have been formulated only for the class “not providing causes hazard” (UCAs from 
1 to 9 in Table 2).  
The further step, i.e. the definition of scenarios, means that two question are arising: 
 
a) Why would Unsafe Control Actions occur? 
b) Why would control actions be improperly executed or not executed, leading to hazards? 
 
The definition of scenarios for all the UCAs mentioned in Table 2 would be too long and 
challenging for the purpose of this paper. Therefore only selected scenarios for UCA – 1 are 
formulated and reported, limiting the analysis to the area of the Safety Control Structure as 




Figure 3: A specific focus on the Safety Control Structure in the perspective of scenarios definition 
 
In the same figure 3 it is clarified that, thinking about the specific UCA,  the two above mentioned 
questions a) and b) in turn requires to meditate on: 
 
1) Unsafe controller behavior 
2) Causes of inadequate feedback /information 
1) Control path 
2) Other factors related to controlled process 
 
As described in Table 2, UCA-1 is: “AUTOMATION does not provide the functional mode of the 
Gen-sets for the requested electric loads during navigation [H 1, H 2]”. 
The identified scenarios are summarized in table 3. 
For the purpose of this paper scenarios 2 and 3 are considered. It is worth mentioning that in 
some cases the sensors and the algorithm of the automation system can be challenged by the ship 
large motions when operating in extreme weather conditions. 
With reference to them, a selection of design heuristics i.e. qualitative design methods 
grounded in experience are identified as a practical basis to provide resilience to the ship in 
operations for example in heavy seas.  
 
1) Unsafe controller 
behaviour
2) Causes of  inadequate
feedback/information
1) Control path




Table 2 The list of Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs): a subset 
Control 
Action 


























UCA-1 AUTOMATION does not 
provide the functional mode of the 
Gen-sets for the requested electric 
loads during navigation [H 1, H 2] 
  
UCA -2 AUTOMATION does not 
provide the functional mode of the 
Gen-sets for the requested electric 
loads during manoeuvring [H 1, H 2] 
  
UCA -3 AUTOMATION does not 
provide the functional mode of the 
Gen-sets for the requested electric 


















































































































Table 3 The definition of scenarios for UCA -1 
 
Scenario 1 for UCA – 1: the Gen-Sets controller (automation system) fails during 
navigation, causing an interruption of power delivery. 
Scenario 2 for UCA – 1: the sensors report inadequately to the automation system that 
parameters are out of the safety range. 
The Gen-Sets do not provide power to the ship in navigation because  the automation 
system has ordered the shutdown: it detects that the engines are going to suffer a 
significant damage due to some functioning parameters out of safety range, due to 
inadequate sensor feedback. 
Scenario 3 for UCA – 1: the specified control algorithm is flawed, so the automation 
system detects that the Gen-Sets  parameters are out of the safety range.  
The Gen-Sets do not provide power to the ship in navigation because the automation 
system has ordered the shutdown: it detects that the engines are going to suffer a 
significant damage due to some functioning parameters out of safety range, decided by a 
flawed control algorithm. 
Scenario 4 for UCA – 1: the automation system sets the Gen-Sets  parameters but this is 
not received by the system. 
Scenario 5 for UCA – 1: the Gen-Sets  suffers of a technical breakdown or malfunction. 
 
From Madni & Jacknson (2009), among the fourteen design heuristics proposed by the 
authors, six could be defined as appropriate for the application: 
 
- Functional redundancy: there should be alternative ways to perform a particular 
function that does not rely on the same physical systems. 
- Human backup: humans should be able to back up automation when there is a context 




- “Human in the loop”: humans should be in the loop when there is a need for “rapid 
cognition” and creative option generation 
- Intent awareness: system and humans should maintain a shared intent model to back 
up each other when called upon 
- Learning/Adaptation: continually acquiring new knowledge from the environment to 
reconfigure, re-optimize, and grow  
- Context spanning: system should be able to survive most likely and worst case 
scenarios, either natural or man-made. 
 
Starting from these selection, In table 4 and 5 some proposals are made in order to implement 
resilience in relation with selected scenarios 2 and 3. The reason why such scenarios are selected 
is because they seem more appropriate to formulate resilience as the integration of operators, 
automation and design. 
For scenario 2, functional redundancy, human backup and context spanning are selected as 
suitable design heuristic. For scenario 3 the learning/adaptation option has been preferred to the 
functional redundancy. 
 
Table 4 Proposal for discussion of resilience implementation – UCA - 1 Scenario 2 
 Functional 
redundancy 
Human backup Context spanning 




point to assess 
whether they actually 
are outside the safety 
range 
The operators should 
be able to make 
decisions independently 
from automation system 
and act accordingly. 
Possibly supported by 
subsidiary devices (see 
column on the left). 
In the preliminary design all the 
possible operational scenarios 
have to be identified in order to 
define the operational domain 
of on board systems (to be 
assumed in the technical 
specifications, for example with 
reference to roll angle and/or 
list angle in heavy seas). 
Table 5 Proposal for discussion of resilience implementation – UCA - 1 Scenario 3 
 Learning/Adaptation Human backup Context spanning 
Scenario 3 The control algorithm 
should be able to 
introduce in the logic 
of the procedure the 
awareness for 
example of stormy 
weather condition and 
in such case submit to 
human beings the 
decision about engine 
shutdown. 
In specific cases like 
engine shut down the 
operators should be 
“consulted” by the 
automation system. 
Operators should 
receive the proper 
training for this. 
In the preliminary design all the 
possible operational scenarios 
has to be identified in order to 
define the operational domain 
of on board systems (to be 
assumed in the technical 
specifications, for example with 
reference to roll angle and/or 
list angle in heavy seas). 
 
From what above it appears how ship resilience is the result of an effective integration between 
operators and automation systems. This is a very important issue at present since automation is 
more and more exploited on board ships. The issue is even more important when automation has 
the total control on systems like GEN-SETs having a strong relation with safety: a stronger 
integration between human operators and the automation should be developed to drive a successful 
decision making for safety. The Safety Control Structure (the relevant part is reported in Figure 4) is 






Figure 4: A specific focus on the Safety Control Structure with GEN-Sets, Automation and Crew 
members connections  
 
When mitigations and safeguards are identified it might be useful to investigate and compare 
different alternative solutions. In this perspective quantifiable metrics for resilience are in principle 
necessary. 
Of course more than one indicator can be used and moreover a proper characterization also in terms 
of costs could help to better appreciate the cost/benefit ratio of the alternatives under investigation 
(Yodo & Wang, 2016).  
With an approach based on STPA, which focuses on the possibility to take action on hazards 
that can be eliminated or controlled, it seems natural to define the metric hinged on the identified 
hazard. 
For the proposed application, the identified hazard is the missing or insufficient power delivery. 
A possible indication for the purpose of this paper is to define as a quantitative indicator the 
percentage of available power with respect to the total power needed, as described below. 
 





It ranges from 0 to 1. When 𝜀 = 1 it means that the implemented resilience makes possible the 
complete delivery of the necessary power. The possibility to monitor with  subsidiary devices the 
GEN-SETs could be implemented for all the units or just the number considered sufficient for 
avoiding the situation of total black-out. When ε = 0.5 it means that only one half of the needed 
power is available. Whether it is sufficiently safe or not is to be decided assuming criteria that set 
the minimum power necessary for propulsion (the weather condition should be considered in this 
case) and for hotel services.  
The resilience by human backup is strongly linked with the provision of subsidiary information 
and training since the decision to interfere with the automation system should be based on the 
possibility to increase the situational awareness in terms of safety. 
Finally it is worthwhile mentioning that this kind of metric is able to quantify the effect of 
resilience over a specific issue like electric power production and delivery. The assessment of an 
overall and more comprehensive ship resilience is, in principle, possible but very complex.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In the paper the possibility to apply STPA technique has been investigated  in order to find out 
where and how resilience should be implemented on board relying on appropriate design heuristics. 
An application case has been carried out with reference to a large cruise vessels. The specific 
issue of black-out on board has been selected and the hazards of propulsion and/or hotel services 
loss have been identified. Relying on the Safety Control Structure, a selection of Unsafe Control 
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Actions has been reported. One UCA has then been selected for the development of scenarios and 
the relevant need for resilience is spotted out.  
STPA has enabled the visualization of the hierarchy among the ship energy system, the 
automation system and the crew members useful to discuss in a design stage the characteristics 
and the logic of the automation system (integration with crew members in decision making included), 
especially when some disruptive conditions like extreme ship motions can characterize the scenario 
and make things difficult for the automation system reliability.  
The implementation of resilience has been proposed in terms of functional redundancy, 
learning/adaptation, human back up and context spanning. It has been put in evidence, in a design 
for operations perspectives, how the capability of a better integration between humans and the 
automation systems is envisaged in such a way that system should allow for human intervention 
needed without requiring humans to make unsubstantiated assumptions. 
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